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COUNTS V. STATE: ABSENT THE DEFENDANT’S CONSENT, 
THE STATE MAY NOT AMEND THE CHARGING 
DOCUMENT IF THE AMENDMENT CHANGES THE 
CHARACTER OF THE OFFENSE. 
 
By: Kristin E. Shields 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that amending a charge from theft 
of property “with a value of less than $1,000” to theft of property “with a value 
of at least $1,000 but less than $10,000” without the defendant’s consent 
changed the character of the offense.  Counts v. State, 444 Md. 52, 55, 118 
A.3d 894, 895 (2015).  Therefore, the court held that such action was 
prejudicial per se because it interfered with the defendant’s right to defend 
himself by not giving notice of the exact charges against him, thereby violating 
Maryland Rule 4-204.  Id. at 66, 118 A.3d at 902. 
     Derrick Counts (“Counts”) was arrested for burglary of an apartment in 
Columbia, Maryland.  Items stolen included a television, laptop, gaming 
system and games, and a vacuum cleaner.  After an investigation, police 
discovered the vacuum cleaner as well as Counts’ identification in his wife’s 
home.  Counts was indicted for the burglary.  Count Four of the five count 
indictment charged him with theft of property with a value of less than $1,000.   
     On the first day of trial in the Circuit Court for Howard County, the 
prosecutor informed the court that the State sought to amend the charging 
document from theft of “less than $1,000” to “theft of at least $1,000 but less 
than $10,000.”  The State reasoned that this amendment was not substantive 
because the potential penalty was the only item that changed, not the elements 
of the crime itself.  Despite objection from defense counsel, the court allowed 
the State’s amendment and the case proceeded.  The jury found Counts guilty 
of fourth degree burglary, which is theft of goods with a value of at least 
$1,000, as well as theft of goods with a value of under $100.   
     Counts appealed only the amendment to Count Four of the original 
indictment.  In the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, Counts argued that 
the trial court erred in allowing the amendment.  The court of special appeals 
affirmed the conviction.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a writ of 
certiorari to review the affirmation. 
     The issue before the court was whether the State’s amendment to Count 
Four, which raised the alleged value of the stolen goods and changed the 
offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, altered the character of the offense 
charged.  Counts, 444 Md. at 58, 118 A.3d at 897.  If it did, amendments to 
the charging document would be impermissible without Counts’ consent.  Id.  
Counts argued that the value of stolen property is an element of the offense for 
the purposes of a felony theft charge.  Id at 60, 118 A.3d at 898-99.  
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     The charge against Counts arose out of the consolidated theft statute in 
Maryland, which combines a number of related crimes into a single statutory 
offense of theft.  Counts, 444 Md. at 58-59, 118 A.3d at 897 (citing Jones v. 
State, 303 Md. 323, 326-37, 493 A.2d 1062, 1063 (1985)).  Within the statute, 
theft offenses are divided into two levels of misdemeanor theft and three levels 
of felony theft, which depend on the value of the stolen goods.  Counts, 444 
Md. at 58-59, 118 A.3d at 897-98.  
    Amendments to charging documents are determined by Maryland Rule 4-
204, which states that a charging document may be amended unless it 
“changes the character of the offense charged,” thus requiring the consent of 
the parties.  Counts, 444 Md. at 57, 118 A.3d at 896-97 (citing Md. Rule 4-
204).  The court noted Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states 
that the accused have the right to know the exact accusation against them.  Id. 
at 57, 118 A.3d at 897 (citing Md. Dec. of R. art. 21).  Accordingly, accused 
persons must be allowed to defend themselves, be protected from future 
prosecutions of the same offense, prepare for trial, provide a legal basis for 
challenging the charging document, and inform the court of the appropriate 
sentence based on the crime charged.  Id. at 57-58, 118 A.3d at 897 (citing 
Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155, 433 A.2d 1150 (1981)).  
     The State argued the value of stolen property is not an element of the crime 
because it “does not require proof of a different or additional act” from the 
originally charged offense.  Counts, 444 Md. at 60, 118 A.3d at 898.  The State 
based its argument on an earlier case in which the court of appeals stated the 
exact value was not as important to the outcome as whether the stolen item has 
at least “some value.”  Id. at 65, 118 A.3d at 901 (citing Jupiter v. State, 328 
Md. 635, 616 A.2d 412 (1992) (emphasis in original)).  In light of this, the 
State maintained that amending the charging document did not change the 
character of the offense.  Id. at 60, 118 A.3d at 898.   
     The court of appeals rejected the State’s interpretation.  Counts, 444 Md. 
at 60, 118 A.3d at 899.  Instead, the court clarified its intent in Jupiter – 
increasing the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony changes the character 
of the offense.  Id. at 65-66, 118 A.3d at 901 (citing Johnson v. State, 358 Md. 
384, 749 A.2d 769 (2000)).  The mere fact that both the original and amended 
charges fall under the same consolidated theft statute does not mean the value 
of the stolen property is not an element of misdemeanor versus felony theft.  
Id. at 61, 118 A.3d at 899 (citing Hagans v. State, 316 Md. 429, 440, 559 A. 
2d 792, 797 (1989)). 
     By way of reinforcement, the court reiterated that while the offenses may 
be under a single statute, the value of the property is determinative of whether 
it is a felony or misdemeanor offense, which are two different crimes in 
Maryland.  Counts, 444 Md. at 62, 118 A.3d at 900 (citing Spratt v. State, 315 
Md. 680, 681, 556 A.2d 667, 667 (1989)).  As such, the value of the stolen 
property is a separate and additional element that the State must prove to the 
jury.  Id. at 64, 118 A.3d at 901. 
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     The court stated that defendants have the right to a finding by jury as to 
whether the stolen property is above or below this threshold.  Counts, 444 Md. 
at 62, 118 A.3d at 900 (citing Spratt, 315 Md. at 686, 556 A.2d at 670). 
Without requiring the State to prove the additional element following the 
amendment of the charging document, the trial court violated Maryland Rule 
4-204, thus rendering its decision prejudicial per se.  Id. at 66, 118 A.3d at 902 
(citing Johnson, 358 Md. at 392, 749 A.2d at 773). 
     In Counts, the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded the amendment to 
the charging document, which changed the alleged crime from misdemeanor 
theft to felony theft, was prejudicial per se because it changed the character of 
the offense without Counts’ consent.  In addition, the court of appeals provided 
clarity to the misconception that sentencing bears little impact on the trial 
itself.  Rather, the decision strengthened the rights of accused persons when it 
comes to the constitutionally guaranteed right to defend themselves against an 
action and their right to know the penalty they face.  Now, practitioners can be 
sure that the value of property stolen is an element of theft, and making 
substantive changes to the character of the offense requires consent of the 
accused well before the start of trial.  This holding is critical to prosecutors, 
because it reinforces the need to prove the value of the property in order to 
urge the court to impose the proper penalty.  It is also equally important to 
defense counsel because it could allow them to potentially bring evidence 
against the State’s assertion of the value of stolen property as a means of 
lowering the charges against their client.  Finally, this case serves as a model 
for judges when it comes to making amendments to charging documents, 
essentially requiring them to ensure that defendants are given ample notice of 
their potential penalty prior to allowing any such amendment. 
